In 2015, then-Home Secretary Theresa May established an inquiry into undercover policing and the operation of the Metropolitan Police’s Special Demonstration Squad (SDS).
The inquiry will consider the deployment of police officers as covert human intelligence sources by the SDS, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit and by other police forces in England and Wales.
It will also conduct a comprehensive review of undercover policing practices, leaving no stone unturned, to identify lessons learned and make recommendations about the way undercover policing is conducted.
The inquiry has now begun to hear evidence and received an opening statement from the Metropolitan Police. For the first time, the true extent of police malpractice is becoming clear.
Below are extracts from the Met’s opening statement:
“Sir, at the outset of this opening statement the Metropolitan Police Service wishes to acknowledge the serious wrongdoing by some SDS undercover officers and the mismanagement by SDS and Metropolitan Police Service Special Branch managers that occurred.”
The Met identified three major failings:
“First, at least nine undercover officers in T2 engaged in deceitful sexual relationships whilst they were deployed. This was completely unacceptable. So, too, was the failure of their managers to identify and prevent those relationships from happening. The Metropolitan Police Service apologises to the women affected and to the public for these failings and for the wider culture of sexism and misogyny which allowed them to happen. It is committed to eradicating all forms of discrimination and to ensuring that undercover policing, like all other policing, is conducted and held to the highest professional standards.
Second, there was unnecessary reporting on political and social justice campaigns, family justice campaigns, community organisations and groups that were campaigning for police accountability. These groups did not present any risk of serious public disorder and were not engaged in any criminal or subversive activity.
Third, despite some good examples of effective management, for example by Detective Inspector HN 109, there was a general failure by the SDS’s managers and by senior managers in Metropolitan Police Special Branch to lead the SDS properly and effectively. These failings extended beyond the issues of illicit sexual relationships and improper engagements with the criminal justice system. Other unprofessional behaviour by undercover officers included inappropriate reporting and the claiming of illegitimate expenses. Such conduct was below the standards that were expected of police officers at the time.”
The Met even failed to take care of its own, admitting:
“Another significant aspect of this is welfare. Although SDS managers did attempt to manage the welfare of undercover officers properly, they didn’t always get it right. Attempts were made to foster a culture in which those struggling with mental health and other issues as a result of their deployments could seek support, but despite this, undercover officers didn’t always feel that they could ask for that support or when they did, it wasn’t always effective. And some officers were undoubtedly harmed by the work that they did.”
As a firm, we continue to monitor this inquiry with great interest. In many ways, it confirms our belief that nothing should be taken at face value and that all evidence deserves the closest scrutiny, even when it comes from those who are supposed to be beyond reproach.